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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
LOIS H. WHITE, Widow of PAUL
WHITE, deceased,
Applicant and Plaintiff,

vs.

Case No.

N. P. METTOME COMPANY, THE
STATE INSURANCE FUND and
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH,

8193

Defendants.

DEFENDANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves an application before the Industrial
Commission of Utah by Lois H. White for benefits. under
the Workmen's Compensation Law on account of the fatal
industrial accident suffered by Paul White on October 6,
1953. After a hearing, the Industrial Commission rendered
its decision denying her claim upon its finding that she
was not a dependent of the deceased employee. She and
her attorney have brought the case to this Court for review.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
We agree with the facts stated by Plaintiff's attorney
on page 2 of his brief, that Lois H. White and Paul White
were married in 1941 and that Paul White was killed in
the course of his employment on October 6, 1953. The
State Insurance Fund carried the compensation insurance
liability of his employer. We also agree with the statement
that there was a decree of divorce awarded to Lois H. White
from Paul White on July 10, 1953. But we think that
Plaintiff's attorney has added some of his own inferences
and conclusions to the facts which he has stated on page
3 of his brief.
With respect to the evidence on the subject of Paul
White's "quitting drinking", Mrs. White testified (Tr. 6
and 7):
"A. Well, I told him that if he'd quit drinking,
why, then I'd drop the divorce proceedings. And
he said he'd try. But he didn't for awhile."
(and at Tr. 8) :
"A. Well, once or twice after we got the decree
I talked ·to him about it. * * * he said he was
quitting drinking, he was doing better about it, and
asked me if I'd reconsider. And I told him that I
would if he, if he could show me that he was quitting drinking. And he said that he wanted to start
coming down and see me again, to show me that he
was quitting, and that. And I told him it was all
right with me, if he could show me that he was turning over a new leaf, as it were, so we could go back
together."
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With respect to the time she met him on the street
and they agreed he would come and see her the following
Sunday, she testified (Tr. 9) :
"A. Well, we wanted to get it squared away
as to whether we would go back together or not."
In other words, her testimony was that if the fatal
accident had not happened, they were going to meet together the following Sunday and discuss whether they
might be able to go back living together.
ARGUMENT
POINT· 1.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WAS CORRECT IN DENYING LOIS H. WHITE'S CLAIM
BECAUSE SHE WAS NOT A DEPENDENT
OF THE DECEASED EMPLOYEE.
On July 10, 1953, Lois White, the applicant and plaintiff
in this case, filed in the Salt Lake County Clerk's office a
divorce action against her husband, Paul White, on the
grounds of mental cruelty. In her complaint she stated
that they owned an equity in a duplex at 1540 South 11th
East, Salt Lake City, Utah, and that they also owned furnishings and furniture at that location. She requested that
she be granted that equity and those furnishings and furniture, and also an automobile which was her own personal
property. Her husband, Paul White, signed an appearance
and waiver before a notary public, and this was also filed
in the Salt Lake County Clerk's office the same day, July
10, 1953. District Judge D. T. Lewis granted the divorce
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as prayed for by the plaintiff the same day the complaint
was filed. The decree granted her the property which she
had requested. In her complaint Lois White had specifically
waived any right to alimony or support money. Accordingly the decree did not grant her any alimony or support
money. Lois White and Paul White did not ever live together after the decree was granted. He was killed three
months later.
The question which was before the Industrial Commission in this case, and is now before the Supreme Court
for determination, is not so much whether Lois H. White
was the wife of Paul White on October 6, 1953, when he
received his fatal accident. The question is not what property rights she might have in a probate proceeding relating
to his estate. The question is whether she comes within
the statutory provision of the Workmen's Compensation
Law relating to death cases. Section 35-1-71, U. C. A. 1953,
specifies:
"The following persons shall be presumed to be
wholly dependent for support upon a deceased employee:
"(1) A wife upon a husband with whom she
lives at the time of his death.
" ( 2) Children under the age of eighteen years
or over such age," if physically or mentally incapacitated, upon the parent, with whom they are living
at the time of the death of such parent, or who is
legally bound for their support.
"In all other cases, the question of dependency,
in whole or in part, shall be determined in accordance with the facts in each particular case existing
at the time of the injury resulting in the death of
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such employee, but no person shall be considered as
dependent unless he is a member of the family of
the deceased employee, or bears to him the relation
of husband or wife, lineal descendant, ancestor, or
brother or sister. The word 'child' as used in this
title shall include a posthumous child, and a child
legally adopted prior to the injury. Half brothers
and sisters shall be included in the words 'brother
or sister' as above used."
Lois White was not living with Paul White at the time
of his death (Tr. 13). Consequently, the only other basis
upon which she might claim compensation benefits must
be found in the category of "all other cases", where the
question of dependency must be determined in accordance
with the facts. The undisputed fact is that Paul White did
not support Lois White after July 10, 1953. She did not
receive any money from him after the divorce decree. She
was not dependent upon him for any of her support, in
fact or in law, at the time he received his fatal accident.
The applicant's attorney has argued that this divorced
couple might have become reconciled and gone back to
living together before the end of the six months interlocutory period. That argument is based upon conjecture. Applicant testified that her husband was "quitting" drinking.
But she did not testify that she was convinced and satisfied
that he had "quit". She testified that it was her "hope and
expectation" that Paul White would "quit drinking and tend
to his business", and that they could go back to living together again (Tr. 10). In other words, she hoped that he
would change his drinking habits and reform. She intended to resume the marriage relationship with him only
when she was satisfied that he had done so. Whether that
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would have ever been the situation prior to the end of the
six months interlocutory period is problematical and conjectural. If her hopes had been realized, the proper Jegal
procedure would have been to apply to the District Court
which had granted the interlocutory decree for an order
vacating the decree and dismissing the divorce action. An
affirmative legal action on her part would have been necessary in order to change her legal status.
Applicant's situation with respect to hopes of a possible reconciliation placed her in a position somewhat similar to that of a woman who is engaged to be married. If
her fiance is killed in an industrial accident prior to the
performance of the marriage ceremony, she is not a "dependent" under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law. They may have had their future marriage
plans all arranged and agreed upon. They may have even
rented a house or an apartment and purchased household
furnishings in contemplation of their intended marriage.
But no matter how near they had come to becoming husband and wife, she is not his "dependent" under the Workmen's Compensation Law, because Section 35-1-71 provides
that:
"* * * the question of dependency * * *
shall be determined in accordance with the facts
* * * existing at the time of the injury resulting in the death of such employee, * * *."
One of the cases cited on page 7 of Plaintiff's brief
was Salt Lake City vs. Industrial Commission, 22 Pac.
(2nd) 1046, 82 Utah 179. In that case the Industrial Commission awarded compensation to Mrs. Alicia Poate as the
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widow of Frank Poate, an employee of Salt Lake City, who
was fatally drowned July 28, 1932, in the course of his
employment. The only question involved in the case was
whether she was his lawful wife at the time of his death.
She had sued and obtained an interlocutory decree of divorce from him on Dec. 14, 1927. On May 14, 1928, the
District Court made an order to the effect that it had been
brought to the attention of the Court that there was a
possibility of a reconciliation between plaintiff and defendant. The Court, upon its own motion, ordered that the
interlocutory decree should not become final until Dec. 13,
1928. On Sept. 25, 1928, the same Judge who granted the
decree and made the previous order, made the following
order:
"On application of the above named parties personally appearing in open court, it is ordered that
the judgment heretofore entered in the above entitled case and the default of the defendant herein
be and the same is hereby set aside and the case
dismissed.''
The parties thereafter resumed marital relations until the
death of Poate as aforesaid. Under the foregoing facts
Salt Lake City contended that the Court was without power
or right to extend the time for the divorce to become final,
and that in any event it was without power to set aside the
decree of divorce and dismiss the action by its subsequent
order of Sept. 25, 1928, as the decree had become final and
after the end of the term in which the decree was entered.
(It was stipulated that the term of Court in which the
decree was entered, had ended at the time said order was
made.)
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The Supreme Court held that the order of the District
Court, setting aside .the decree and dismissing the action,
was not void on its face and was valid for the purpose of
the proceeding in question; that each of the parties to the
divorce action would have been estopped to question the
validity of the order; therefore, the employer was not in
any better position to question it. The order of the Commission awarding compensation was affirmed.
That case was considerably different from the situation of Mrs. White in our present case. In the Salt Lake
City case Mrs. Poate had obtained a dismissal of the divorce action and was living with Mr. Poate and being
supported by him for four years prior to his fatal accident.
A recent case in which the Supreme Court of Utah
ruled upon our present question was Loretta Earley, for
herself and on behalf of Joanne L. Mcintyre, Sharon Mcintyre and Carol Mcintyre, minor children of Jack L. Mcintyre, deceased, vs. The Inaustrial Commission of Utah, 265
Pac. (2nd) 390. (Decision dated Dec. 30, 1953.)
The greater part of the Supreme Court's opinion in
this case deals with the rights of the minor children of the
deceased employee, Jack L. Mcintyre, to compensation benefits on account of his accidental death. But there was also
involved in this case the question of whether the employee's
widow was entitled to compensation benefits. She had
lived with him for 15 years prior to May 1, 1951. He had
been the sole support of her and their children until December, 1950, when she started to work as a psychiatric
technician. After Mr. Mcintyre left her and the children
on May 1, 1951, they received no assistance from him. A
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month after his departure Mrs. Mcintyre filed a divorce
action. She had not been able to obtain personal service
of summons upon him, and before she could have summons
published Mr. Mcintyre was killed in an automobile accident in the course of his employment on September 29,
1951. About two weeks later Mrs. Mcintyre married Mr.
Early. Thereafter she filed with the Industrial Commission
of Utah a claim on behalf of herself and the Mcintyre
children. The Industrial Commission denied compensation
to both her and the children.
The Supreme Court of Utah held that the children
were entitled to compensation on account of the death of
their father. But the Court also held that the Industrial
Commission was correct in denying compensation to Mr.
Mcintyre's widow. The Court's opinion in effect held that
inasmuch as she was not living with him at the time of
his fatal accident there was no legal presumption that she
was dependent upon him, and that the facts in the case
did not justify a finding that she was dependent upon him.

Koeppel vs. E. I. Dupont De Nemours & Company, 194
Atl. 847, was a Delawar~ case in which the claimant was
the widow of John Koeppel, who was fatally injured on
March 15, 1935, in the course of his employment. There
were no minor children. Claimant had married the employee in 1903. They lived together until May, 1924, when
they separated. Thereafter they never resumed cohabitation. For about six years following their separation the
deceased paid to the claimant $10.00 per week under a
voluntary arrangement. For the next four years and ten
months the only payment he made to her was $1.00 just
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prior to Christmas, 1934, at which time he stated he would
give her additional sums later on. No civil or criminal
proceedings were ever instituted by her against her husband to compel him to support her. The Court held she
was not entitled to compensation, because the Delaware
Workmen's Compensation Law provided that:
"No compensation shall be payable under this
section to a widow, unless she was living with her
deceased husband at the time of his death or was
then actually dependent upon him for support."

Plaintiff's attorney has cited several cases in his brief
relating to the subject of divorce decrees, but most of these
cases are not in point in our present discussion because
they do not involve facts having any similarity to the factual situation existing in the case at bar. On page 4 of
Plaintiff's brief is cited the case of Remley vs. Remley,
193 Pac. 604. On page 5 of Plaintiff's brief is cited Gould
vs. Superior Court, 191 Pac. 56. On page 6 of Plaintiff's
brief is cited Gloyd vs. Superior Court, 185 Pac. 995. On
page 7 of Plaintiff's brief is cited Klebora vs. Klebora, 5
Pac. (2nd) 965. All four of these cases are California
decisions involving questions relating to property rights
after an interlocutory divorce decree had been entered,
but the final decree had not yet been entered as is necessary
under the California procedure. None of these cases involved any provision of the Workmen's Compensation Law,
and none of them involved any question of "dependency"
upon a deceased employee. That was also the situation in
the Utah case of Johnson's Estate-Johnson vs. Johnson,
It
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35 Pac. (2nd) 305, 84 Utah 168, which was cited on page
7 of Plaintiff's brief.
In the case of McGarry vs. Ind. Comm., 222 Pac. 592,
63 Utah 81, which was cited on page 8 of Plaintiff's brief,
the deceased employee, Delos Bradley had married his wife
in 1914, and they had a child in 1915. Bradley lived with
his wife and child until the early part ·of 1916 and supported them. Between then and November, 1919, he deserted them and assumed the name of "Jack Wilson". His
wife obtained a divorce from him in Idaho on November
11, 1919. After Bradley was killed in an industrial accident in Utah in October, 1922, his former wife applied for
compensation benefits for their son. The Industrial Commission of Utah granted an award for him, apparently
upon the theory that he was presumed to be dependent
because he was legally entitled to support from his father.
(That was before the statute had been amended to so provide.)
The Supreme Court of Utah annulled the award because the facts showed that the boy was not living with
the father at the time of the fatal accident. Also, the
Commission had not made any findings of actual dependency. There was no discussion in the Court's opinion as
to whether the divorced wife was entitled to any compensation benefits for herself; she had not applied for any
such benefits.
In the case of Diaz vs. Ind. Comm., 13 Pac. (2nd) 307,
80 Utah 77, which is cited on page 7 of Plaintiff's brief,
there was no divorce action involved. All that was con-
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tained in the opinion written by Justice Straup relating
to the matter of dependency of the wife and grandchild
was obiter dicta. He was the only one of the five justices
who discussed the matter of dependency. Each of the other
four justices held that the evidence before the Industrial
Commission was such as to require a finding that Mr. Diaz'
death did not result from an industrial accident. Therefore,
nobody would be entitled to compensation as a dependent,
no matter what their relationship was to the deceased employee. In that case there was evidence that Diaz had supplied some support to his wife and her granddaughter
during the period he had lived separately from them.
In the case of Utah Galena Corp. vs. Ind. Comm., 5
Pac. (2nd) 242, 78 Utah 495, which is cited on page 8 of
Plaintiff's brief, one sentence in the Court's opinion shows
that there is no similarity to the question involved in that
case and the question involved in the case at bar. At 78
Utah page 497 is found the following:
"The only question presented by this appeal is
whether * * * the Industrial Commission may
under any circumstances award compensation on account of dependency to a male child over the age of
16 at the time of the death of the parent, and who
is not physically or mentally incapacitated from
earning.''
Point One of Plaintiff's brief states that the. Industrial
Commission erred in finding that Lois H. White and Paul
White were not husband and wife. We have carefully examined the Referee's recommendations and the Industrial
Commission's decision in this case, and we do not see any

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13

finding that Lois H. White and Paul White were not husband and wife at the time of his accident. Whether they
were husband and wife at the time is not a controlling
factor in this case. Even though it be conceded for the
purpose of argument that she was still his wife when he
was fatally injured, that would not entitle her to compensation benefits unless she met the statutory requirements
of either living with him or being supported by him. The
Industrial Commission's findings and decision on those
latter two points were soundly based on undisputed evidence.
Inasmuch as Paul White was killed in the course of
his employment and did not leave any dependents, the State
Insurance Fund is required to pay his. funeral expenses and
also to pay $1,800.00 into the Combined Injury Benefit
Fund, as provided by Section 35-1-68, subsection 1, U. C.
A. 1953.

CONCLUSION
The Industrial Commission's order, denying compensation benefits to Lois H. White, should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER,
Attorney General,
F. A. TROTTIER,
Attorneys for Defendants.
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